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Abstract. In this work we present analysis for the block cipher SC2000 ,
which is in the Japanese CRYPTREC portfolio for standardization. In
spite of its very complex and non-linear key-schedule we have found a
property of the full SC2000-256 (with 256-bit keys) which allows the
attacker to find many pairs of keys which generate identical sets of sub-
keys. Such colliding keys result in identical encryptions. We designed an
algorithm that efficiently produces colliding key pairs in 239 time, which
takes a few hours on a PC. We show that there are around 268 collid-
ing pairs, and the whole set can be enumerated in 258 time. This result
shows that SC2000-256 cannot model an ideal cipher. Furthermore we
explain how practical collisions can be produced for both Davies-Meyer
and Hiroses hash function constructions instantiated with SC2000-256 .
Keywords: SC2000 · block cipher · key collisions · equivalent keys ·
CRYPTREC · hash function
1 Introduction
The block cipher SC2000 [15] was designed by researchers from Fujitsu
and the Science University of Tokyo, and submitted to the open call for
128-bit encryption standards organized by Cryptography Research and
Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC). Started in 2000, CRYPTREC is
a program of the Japanese government set up to evaluate and recom-
mend cryptographic algorithms for use in industry and institutions across
Japan. An algorithm becomes a CRYPTREC recommended standard af-
ter two stages of evaluations. Unlike AES, eSTREAM and SHA-3 compe-
titions, the evaluation stages of CRYPTREC do not have strictly defined
time limits, but an algorithm progresses to the next stage (or becomes
a standard), when its security level has been confirmed by a substantial
amount of cryptanalysis. CRYPTREC takes into account all published
cryptanalysis in academia and, as well, hires experts to evaluate the se-
curity of the algorithm. SC2000 has passed the first two stages, and for
a decade it was among the recommended standards.
Cryptanalysis of the full 6.5-7.5 round (depending on the key size)
SC2000 is still unknown, however, single-key attacks on round-reduced
SC2000 were presented in several papers: boomerang and rectangle at-
tacks on 3.5 rounds by Dunkelman and Keller[7] and Biham et al.[2],
high probability 3.5-round differential characteristics were used in 4.5-
round attack by Raddum and Knudsen [13], iterative differential and lin-
ear characteristics resulting in attacks on 4.5 rounds by Yanami et al. [17],
and a differential attack on 5 rounds by Lu [10].
In spite of considerable evaluation effort by world leading analysts,
the cryptanalytic progress on the cipher was slow. A possible reason is
given in one of the evaluation reports [16] – the authors state that “...
the design is complicated and uses components which do not facilitate
for easy analysis”. Indeed, SC2000 uses surprisingly large number of dif-
ferent operations: modular additions, subtractions and multiplications,
bitwise additions (XOR), two S-boxes of different size (5 bits and 6 bits),
diffusion layers based on multiplications by binary matrices, and rota-
tions. Compared to the widely used design methods such as substitution-
permutations (SP) networks (only S-boxes and diffusion layers), or ARX
(additions, rotations and XOR), SC2000 seems too complex, which in
turn makes the analysis hard to perform. Moreover, in SC2000 there are
more operations in the key schedule than in the state – this may explain
the absence of the key schedule attacks. This paper is the first analysis on
the key schedule – we find a weakness in the complex key schedule that we
exploit to find colliding keys, i.e. two different master keys that result in
the same subkeys. Our result works on the full cipher and independently
of the number of its rounds.
In [11] Matsui investigates the behavior of colliding key pairs for the
stream cipher RC4. He shows that even in the case of a key size as small
as 24 bytes, there are related keys that create the same initial state, hence
they generate the same pseudo-random byte stream. In other words, the
streams collide. Matsui’s discovery is rather interesting and unexpected as
the number of possible distinct initial states in RC4 is 256! ≈ 21684 while
the number of states generated from 24-byte key is only 2192. No key col-
lisions should occur in any cipher (the key schedule should be injective),
in particular in ciphers that have strictly expandable key schedule, where
the accumulative size of the subkeys is larger than the size of the master
key. The ratio of the expanded key size/master key size usually depends
on the number of rounds and on the length of subkey input in each round.
For example, in AES-256 this ratio is 7.5 as there are 15 128-bit subkeys
produced from the 256-bit master key. Colliding keys are often called
equivalent keys and the existence of such keys is known for a few ciphers.
For instance, Robshaw [14] has shown that another CRYPTREC candi-
date, the block cipher CIPHERUNICORN-A, has equivalent keys. Kelsey
et al. [9] found trivial equivalent keys for the Tiny Encryption Algorithm
(TEA) block cipher. Furthermore, Aumasson et al. [1] have discovered
that the ISDB Scrambling Algorithm, the cipher MULTI2, allows such
keys as well.
For SC2000-256 , despite the fact that the total size of the subkeys is
8 times larger than the size of the master key, we show that this cipher
does not have an injective key schedule. There exists a set of 268 pairs of
colliding master keys – each pair is composed of two different master keys
that after the key schedule lead to the same set of subkeys. Therefore
encryptions of any plaintext under the first and under the second key
produce the same ciphertext, hence the two master keys are equivalent.
We achieve the collisions in the subkeys by exploiting weaknesses in the
two-stage key schedule: in the first stage we efficiently find a key pair that
results in two intermediate keys with a special relation, which in turn is
a sufficient condition for the second stage to produce the same subkeys.
Our algorithm for finding a colliding key pair requires only 239 op-
erations, and we have tested our analysis in practice by implementing a
search on a regular PC. The produced collisions (see Tbl. 1) confirm the
correctness of the analysis and the complexity of the algorithm. We show
how an attacker can use the colliding key pairs in order to construct prac-
tical collisions in hash functions instantiated with SC2000-256 . In both
single-block-length Davies-Meyer hash, and in the double-block-length Hi-
rose’s hash [8] the level of collisions resistance drops from 64,128 to only
39 bits, if instantiated with SC2000-256 . This suggests that SC2000-256 ,
although possibly secure for encryption, has a serious key-schedule weak-
ness and cannot model an ideal cipher.
2 Description of SC2000-256
SC2000 is 128-bit block cipher that supports 128, 192, and 256-bit keys.
In this work we focus on 256-bit key cipher, further denoted as SC2000-
256 . This cipher has 7.5 rounds, but our analysis is independent of the
number of rounds and the round function, as it is valid for any number
and for any function. Therefore, in the sequel we describe only the key
schedule.
Most of the operations in the key schedule are word-oriented. The only
exception is Sfunc, which is a bijective non-linear operation that applies
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Fig. 1. The operation Sfunc used in the key schedule of SC2000-256 .
in parallel 5-bit and 6-bit S-boxes (see Fig. 2). The 32-bit input word
is split into six chunks of sizes 6,5,5,5,5, and 6 bits, respectively, then
6-bit or 5-bit S-boxes (depending on the size of the chunk) are applied
to the chunks, and finally the outputs of the S-boxes are concatenated to
produce the final output of Sfunc. The remaining operations in the key
schedule are all word-oriented, and include:
1. Mfunc : bijective linear transformation which is a multiplication by a
32x32 matrix. The input is seen as a vector of 32 elements, and it is
multiplied by a binary matrix.
2. +, : addition mod 232.
3. −, : subtraction mod 232.
4. ×, : multiplication mod 232.
5. ⊕ : XOR (bitwise addition).
6. ≪ 1 : rotation by 1 bit to the left of 32-bit words.
The key schedule needs two steps (or phases) to produce the subkey
words (used in the round functions) from the master key. At the begin-
ning, it starts by dividing the 256-bit master key into eight 32-bit words
ukj , j = 0, 1, . . . , 7, called master key words.
The first phase, called intermediate key generation, takes the 8 words
ukj and outputs 12 intermediate key words ai, bi, ci, di, i = 0, 1, 2 (see
Fig. 2). It applies four similar transformations, called branches, to the
four pairs of master key words: the first branch operates on uk0, uk1 and
produces a0, a1, a2, the second branch on uk2, uk3 and outputs b0, b1, b2,
etc. Hence each triplet of intermediate key words depends only on two
master key words. In a pseudo code, this phase can be described as:
for i = 0→ 2 do
ai ←Mf (Sf ((Mf (Sf (uk0)) + Mf (Sf (4i)))⊕Mf (Sf (uk1))))
bi ←Mf (Sf ((Mf (Sf (uk2)) + Mf (Sf (4i + 1)))⊕Mf (Sf (uk3))))
ci ←Mf (Sf ((Mf (Sf (uk4)) + Mf (Sf (4i + 2)))⊕Mf (Sf (uk5))))
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Fig. 2. The intermediate key generation used in SC2000-256 .
di ←Mf (Sf ((Mf (Sf (uk6)) + Mf (Sf (4i + 3)))⊕Mf (Sf (uk7))))
end for
The second phase, called extended key generation, takes the 12 in-
termediate key words and produces 64 subkey words eki, i = 0, 1, . . . , 63,
called extended key words. Each subkey word is obtained with a non-
symmetric transformation (see Fig. 3) of four intermediate key words
that come from different branches, hence every subkey word depends on
all master key words. For each subkey word, to determine which four
intermediate key words should be taken, and in what order, this phase
requires two lookup tables. The first table Order specifies the order (re-
call that the transformation is non-symmetric, so the order matters) in
which the words are put into the transformation. The second table Index
determines which word within a branch should be taken. As a result, no
two subkey words depend on the same intermediate key words put in
the same order. Refer to Fig. 3 for a pictorial view of the non-symmetric
transformation and for the values of the lookup tables. In a pseudo code,
the second phase can be described as:
for i = 0→ 63 do
s← i (mod 9)
t← (i + b i36c ) (mod 12)
X ← Order[t][0]
x← Index[s][0]
Y ← Order[t][1]
y ← Index[s][1]
Z ← Order[t][2]
z ← Index[s][2]
W ← Order[t][3]
w ← Index[s][3]
     Order 
 t    X Y Z W
 0   a b c d
 1   b a d c
 2   c d a b
 3   d c b a
 4   a c d b
 5   b d c a
 6   c a b d
 7   d b a c
 8   a d b c
 9   b c a d
10  c b d a
11  d a c b
   Index
s  x y z w
0  0 0 0 0
1  1 1 1 1
2  2 2 2 2
3  0 1 0 1
4  1 2 1 2
5  2 0 2 0
6  0 2 0 2
7  1 0 1 0
8  2 1 2 1
<<< 1
Xx Yy
<<< 1
Zz Ww
<<< 1
ek , i = 0,...,63i
Fig. 3. The non-symmetric transformation used in the extended key generation (left),
and the values of the lookup tables (right).
eki ← (Xh≪ 1 + Yy)⊕ ((Zz≪ 1−Ww)≪ 1)
end for
As the description of the key schedule suffices to understand our attack,
for a full specification of the cipher we refer the interested reader to [15].
3 Key Collisions for SC2000-256
For SC2000-256 , we show how to find two distinct master keys that pro-
duce the same subkey words and hence we obtain key collisions. The core
idea of our analysis is a weakness in the the second phase (extended key
generation) – it can cancel a particular input difference (i.e. a particular
difference in each pair of intermediate key words), resulting in subkey col-
lisions. If we are able to deterministically find two master keys that after
the first phase produce the particular difference, then the second phase
will cancel the difference, and we will end up with collisions. Therefore,
to present the analysis we focus on:
1. (Second phase) Specify the difference in intermediate key words,
and prove that it leads to collisions after the second phase.
2. (First phase) Give an algorithm that finds two master keys that lead
to the difference in the intermediate key words after the first phase.
This seemingly upside-down approach (at the beginning we analyze the
second phase, and then the first), is taken to understand why the algo-
rithm at step 2 has to target the specific difference (and not some other).
Notations. With superscripts 1 and 2 we denote various master, inter-
mediate and extended keys for the first and respectively the second mas-
ter key, e.g. a20 is the first intermediate key produced from the second
master key, ek110 is the eleventh subkey word produced from the first
master key. The subscript h stands for hexadecimal number, for instance
80000000h is 2
31. With X we denote the bitwise negation of the word X,
i.e. X = X ⊕ (−1), while ∧ stands for bitwise AND.
3.1 Specifying the Difference for the Second Phase
Let us start our analysis by focusing on the second phase. The following
Lemma defines the required difference (and the additional conditions) in
the intermediate key words, that plays the main role in the analysis:
Lemma 1. Let each pair (X1, X2) in the set of pairs of intermediate key
words (a1i , a
2
i ), (b
1
i , b
2
i ), (c
1
i , c
2
i ), (d
1
i , d
2
i ), i = 0, 1, 2 satisfy the following
two conditions:
Condition 1 X2 = X1 + 3,
Condition 2 X1 ∧ 8000000fh = 80000003h.
Then the extended key generation will produce the same extended keys
(subkey words), i.e. ek1i = ek
2
i , i = 0, . . . , 63.
The Lemma claims that if: (Condition 1) the pairs of intermediate
words produced from the first and the second master key have the special
relation, and (Condition 2) the intermediate key words produced from the
first master key have particular values in five bits (the most significant,
and the four least significant), then after the second phase they will lead
to the same subkeys. The Condition 2 becomes clear in the proof, and
when the five bits have this specific value, the probability that the subkey
words collide is 1, otherwise it is less than 1.
Proof. To prove the Lemma we focus on the extended key generation
function
f(X,Y, Z,W ) = (X≪ 1 + Y )⊕ [(Z≪ 1−W )≪ 1].
We claim that if X,Y, Z,W are randomly chosen words with the MSB
fixed to 1 and the four LSBs fixed to 3, then
f(X,Y, Z,W ) = f(X + 3, Y + 3, Z + 3,W + 3).
Let us rewrite f as an XOR of two functions g, h, i.e.
f(X,Y, Z,W ) = g(X,Y )⊕ h(Z,W ),
g(X,Y ) = X≪ 1 + Y,
h(Z,W ) = (Z≪ 1−W )≪ 1.
We will prove that
g(X,Y )⊕ g(X + 3, Y + 3) = fffffff7h, (1)
h(Z, Y )⊕ h(Z + 3,W + 3) = fffffff7h, (2)
and thus
f(X,Y, Z,W )⊕ f(X + 3, Y + 3, Z + 3,W + 3) =
g(X,Y )⊕ h(Z,W )⊕ g(X + 3, Y + 3)⊕ h(Z + 3,W + 3) = 0.
We need to following supplementary facts:
Fact 1 Let X,Y be 32-bit words. If X∧7fffffffh+Y ∧7fffffffh < 231
then
(X + Y )≪ 1 = X≪ 1 + Y ≪ 1.
Proof. The fact can be seen as corollary of Theorem 4.11 from [5]. uunionsq
Fact 2 For any values X,Y
X + Y = X + Y + 1.
Proof. Note that for any value V , V ⊕ V = V + V = −1, and thus
V = −1− V . Therefore:
X + Y = −1− (X + Y ) = (−1−X) + (−1− Y ) + 1 = X + Y + 1
uunionsq
Fact 3 If U ∧m = 0 then U ⊕ (U + m) = ffffffffh ⊕m.
Proof. When U ∧m = 0, then U + m = U ⊕m. Therefore
U ⊕ (U + m) = U ⊕ U ⊕m = ffffffffh ⊕m.
uunionsq
Now we are ready to present the proof of the Lemma. We will prove only
the part for g – the part for h is similar and instead of modular addition
we have to work with modular subtraction. Let us focus on (1). We get:
g(X,Y )⊕ g(X + 3, Y + 3) = (3)
= (X≪ 1 + Y )⊕ ((X + 3)≪ 1 + Y + 3) = (4)
= (X≪ 1 + Y )⊕ ((X)≪ 1 + 3≪ 1 + Y + 3) = (5)
= (X≪ 1 + Y )⊕ ((X≪ 1 + Y ) + 9) = (6)
= (X≪ 1 + Y )⊕ ((X≪ 1 + Y ) + 8) = (7)
= U ⊕ (U + 8), (8)
where U = X≪ 1 + Y . The transition (4) to (5) is due to Fact 1 – the
two least significant bits of X are 00 thus X ∧7fffffffh+3 < 231. Note,
this is where we actually use the requirement of Condition 2: the two
least significant bits of X must be ’11’. The transition (6) to (7) is due to
Fact 2. Finally, the four least significant bits of U are 0101 (again use of
Condition 2!) and thus by Fact 3, g(X,Y )⊕g(X+3, Y +3) = fffffff7h.
This concludes the proof. uunionsq
We have discovered the strange conditions of the Lemma (and then
provided a formal proof), when we analyzed the behavior of the non-
symmetric function f – it became clear that f cancels some modular
differences. The similarity of the left and the right side (the function g
and the function h without the final rotation) of f , and the fact that the
rotations are only on 1 bit, suggested that there may exist a universal
difference for the intermediate words, such that cancellation in f would
occur when all four words have this difference. We started experimenting
with various differences between X and X, and various values for the
two most significant bit (as in h we have twice rotation on 1 to the
left, we took 2 bits), and several least significant bits. The experiments
were implemented as an exhaustive computer search that tries all such
differences and bit values, and for each combination checks the probability
that f cancels the difference. The results of our experiment led to the
actual Conditions 1,2.
3.2 Finding Pairs in the First Phase
Let us focus on the first phase and produce a pair of master key words
that after this phase result in pairs of intermediate key words that comply
with Conditions 1 and 2 of the Lemma. For the sake of simplicity, first we
take into account only Condition 1, and later we consider Condition 2.
Let u1i , i = 0, . . . , 7 be the words of the first master key K1, and
u2i , i = 0, . . . , 7 be the words of the second master key K2. Let Ui be the
corresponding words of the master keys after the application of Sfunc and
Mfunc, i.e. U
j
i = Mfunc(Sfunc(u
j
i ))), i = 0, . . . , 7, j = 1, 2. Also, let Ii be
the constants Ii+1 = Mfunc(Sfunc(4 · i)), i = 0, 1, 2. Then, taking into
account the intermediate key generation procedure, Condition 1 for the
pairs (a1i , a
2
i ), i = 0, 1, 2 is equivalent to solving the following system of
equations (refer to Fig. 4):
(U10 + I1)⊕ U11 = A1 (9)
(U10 + I2)⊕ 2 · U11 = B1 (10)
(U10 + I3)⊕ 3 · U11 = C1 (11)
(U20 + I1)⊕ U21 = A2 (12)
(U20 + I2)⊕ 2 · U21 = B2 (13)
(U20 + I3)⊕ 3 · U21 = C2 (14)
A2 = S−1func(M
−1
func(Mfunc(Sfunc(A
1)) + 3)) (15)
B2 = S−1func(M
−1
func(Mfunc(Sfunc(B
1)) + 3)) (16)
C2 = S−1func(M
−1
func(Mfunc(Sfunc(C
1)) + 3)) (17)
Let G(x) = S−1func(M
−1
func(Mfunc(Sfunc(x))+3)). Then the system can
be rewritten as:
(U10 + I1)⊕ U11 = G((U20 + I1)⊕ U21 )
(U10 + I2)⊕ 2 · U11 = G((U20 + I2)⊕ 2 · U21 )
(U10 + I3)⊕ 3 · U11 = G((U20 + I3)⊕ 3 · U21 )
The system has three equations and four unknowns (U10 , U
1
1 , U
2
0 , U
2
1 ) –
theoretically, for any values of I1, I2, I3 and a bijective function G
1, it
has 232 solutions. To produce one solution, we find a good pair of master
keys for the first two intermediate words (the first two equations of the
system), and then we check if the pair is good as well for the third. The
algorithm is as follows:
1. Fix random A1, B1.
1 This is not always the case as the authors have tried to launch a much simpler attack
with A1 = A2, B1 = B2, C1 = C2 and failed due to the fact that no solutions exist
for such system.
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Fig. 4. The intermediate values used to describe the algorithm in the first branch (with
outputs a0, a1, a2). The values produced from the first master key are on the left and
have a dark red color, while from the second are on the right and have blue color.
R,S, T are 32-bit words that do not have specified values.
2. Find U10 , U
1
1 that satisfy Equations (9) and (10).
3. Compute C1 from U10 , U
1
1 with (11).
4. Produce A2, B2 from A1, B1 with the function G by (15),(16).
5. Find U20 , U
2
1 that satisfy Equations (12) and (13).
6. Compute C2 from U20 , U
2
1 with (14).
7. Compute C˜2 from C1 with the function G by (17).
8. If C2 is not equal to C˜2 go to Step 1.
9. The quartet (U10 , U
1
1 , U
2
0 , U
2
1 ) is the solution for the system.
The values of C2 and C˜2 coincide with probability 2−32, hence to find a
solution, we need to repeat around 232 times the Steps 1-7. The complex-
ity of each step is constant (just an application of a formula), with the
exception of Steps 2 and 5 – here, we need to find the unknown (U0, U1)
given the two equations:
(U0 + I1)⊕ U1 = A
(U0 + I2)⊕ 2 · U1 = B
After basic algebraic transformations, they are reduced to the form:
U1 = ((2 · U1 ⊕B) + (I1 − I2))⊕A (18)
U0 = (A⊕ U1)− I1 (19)
Thus we want to efficiently solve Equation (18)2. The complexity of find-
ing the value of U1 is given by the following Lemma. We note that the
algorithm relies on solving a word equation and to a certain extend is
similar to the algorithms from [3].
Lemma 2. There is an algorithm that, with complexity linear in the size
of the words, finds the unique solution of the equation:
X = ((2 ·X ⊕B) + C)⊕A, (20)
where A,B,C are some word constants.
Proof. Let us use subscripts to denote the bits of a word, e.g. X5 is the
sixth least significant bit of the word X. The multiplication 2 ·X is a shift
to the left of X by one position, and therefore the (s + 1)-th bit of 2 ·X
is indeed the s-th bit of X, or in our notation (2 ·X)s = Xs−1. We solve
the above Equation (20) bit by bit, starting from the least significant bit,
and moving towards the most significant bit. In other words, we use a
recursive algorithm: first show how to find the least significant (i.e. 0-th)
bit, and assuming that we have found the t-th bit, describe how we can
find the (t+ 1)-th bit. The equation involves modular addition, therefore
for each bit we should keep track of the carry – with cri we denote the
carry bit of (2 ·X ⊕B) + C at i-th bit position.
– Bit 0. For the least significant bit, Equation (20) takes the form:
X0 = B0 ⊕ C0 ⊕A0,
hence the least significant bit of X0 can be uniquely determined with
a simple XOR of three bits, while cr0 = B0 · C0.
– Bit t + 1. We assume we have the previous carry crt, and we have
found the value for Xt. Then for the bit t + 1, we have:
Xt+1 = Xt ⊕Bt+1 ⊕ Ct+1 ⊕ crt ⊕At+1
and for the carry we get crt+1 = m(Xt ⊕ Bt+1, Ct+1, crt), where
m(x, y, z) = xy⊕xz⊕yz. Again, Xt+1, crt+1 are determined uniquely
with a constant number of operations.
As each step of the algorithm requires constant number of operations,
and there are n steps in total (n is the word size), we can claim that
the complexity of finding the unique solution is linear in the size of the
words. uunionsq
2 Once we have the value of U1, we can easily find U0 by (19).
The Lemma gives us the complexity for the Steps 2 and 5 of the algorithm,
i.e. we can solve the system for any A,B with a constant complexity (since
n = 32). As a result, the total complexity of the algorithm is 232.
Now we are ready to consider Condition 2. To satisfy this condition (as
well as Condition 1), we have to slightly tweak our algorithm and make
sure that we have the precise value in the 5 bits of each intermediate
key word produced from the first master key. Further we present the full
algorithm for computing the pair of master key words that produces the
required intermediate key words in the first branch:
1. Fix random R,S such that the most significant bits of R,S are 1,
and the values of the four least significant bits equal 3. Compute
A1 = S
−1
func(M
−1
func(R)), B1 = S
−1
func(M
−1
func(S)).
2. Find U10 , U
1
1 that satisfy Equations (9) and (10).
3. Compute C1 from U10 , U
1
1 with (11).
4. Produce A2, B2 from A1, B1 with the function G by (15),(16).
5. Find U20 , U
2
1 that satisfy Equations (12) and (13).
6. Compute C2 from U20 , U
2
1 with (14).
7. Compute C˜2 from C1 with the function G by (17).
8. If C2 is not equal to C˜2, or in the word T such that T = Mfunc(Sfunc(C
2)),
the most significant bit of T is not 1, or the value of the four least
significant bits is not 3, go to Step 1.
9. The quartet (U10 , U
1
1 , U
2
0 , U
2
1 ) is the solution for the system.
The new method of defining the values of A1, B1 introduced at Step
1, does not change the complexity of the algorithm (compared to the
previous). On the other hand, the additional filter at Step 8 (condition
on 5 bits) increases the frequency of repeating Steps 1-7 by a factor of 25.
Hence, the total complexity of the algorithm is 232 · 25 = 237.
The above complexity is required to find the values of U10 , U
1
1 , U
2
0 , U
2
1 ,
which are the 4 words produced from a pair of two master key words in the
first branch only. To find the precise value of the pair of two master key
words, i.e. to find (u10, u
1
1), (u
1
1, u
2
1), we just need to invert Sfunc,Mfunc (see
Fig. 4), hence uji = S
−1
func(M
−1
func(U
j
i )), i = 0, 1, j = 1, 2. Computing the
values of the master key words for all four branches can be done similarly,
and with complexity 4 · 237 = 239. Therefore, in 239 we can find a pair of
master key words, that after the first phase result in a pair of intermediate
key words that comply with the conditions of Lemma 1, and thus after
the second phase lead to colliding subkey words. Therefore, encryption
of any plaintext under the first, and under the second key, produces the
same ciphertext.
4 Results and Applications
We have implemented the above search for colliding keys on a PC and,
in a matter of hours, we were able to find a pair of master keys (K1,K2)
that produces the same subkeys. The words of the master keys are given
in Tbl 1. These practical results confirm our analysis and the complexity
of the algorithm.
Table 1. Example of colliding pair of master keys for SC2000-256
K1 0x59d0d459 0x4473d8dd 0xcc7d3064 0xd3bbda93
0x8ff60b58 0xe9dc073d 0x8776c115 0x743c9cfe
K2 0x10672240 0xb94214ff 0x2bc72c50 0x539cdd3e
0xf9e9f251 0x921811fa 0x35bf5b7f 0x82ab8bdd
ek1, ek2 0xff582ab3 0x4d261f23 0xcb9f9ad3 0x7c81f9c2
0x0997d523 0xc42fc563 0x2172df72 0x95d8dcb3
0x18121223 0x9d034e02 0x1baa1423 0xe9190113
0x4d148522 0xd9247b13 0xb49e6723 0xa393b3e3
0x3953dbc3 0xb2f85ee2 0x0c17c0a2 0x29d7a162
0x45ba8593 0x14eb6423 0xe4780213 0xdf8f8b23
0xd7b48013 0xb5a368a3 0xc47fffc3 0xdee3ff23
0x4f279343 0xb4a34873 0xe2881a63 0x0c1b8372
0xae1a47e3 0x3285cd02 0x96418533 0x8a904d03
0xf1633b43 0x0664d382 0x35fb0a83 0xe246b6c2
0x8fc44d93 0x2fe1e763 0xd2823073 0x530dffc2
0xe7dd8fe3 0xe4503972 0xad5f9022 0xdebed232
0x10a9a642 0x9db60612 0x3ea3de03 0x5ed728a2
0x3941d142 0xd961e823 0x43df53b2 0x7d7f7a82
0x766512c3 0x6d9e3863 0xaacccc73 0xf74a2b92
0x9ca25a32 0xd6a613e2 0x94819ca3 0xc98a4542
Our next task is to find the number of colliding key pairs. A careful
look at the proposed algorithm reveals the number. At Step 1, we can
choose 232−5 = 227 possible values for A1, and the same number for B1.
The equations at Steps 2 and 5 can be solved always, thus there are 22·27 =
254 different values for the tuple (U10 , U
1
1 , C
1, A2, B2, U20 , U
2
1 , C
2, C˜2) ob-
tained at Steps 2-7. The condition at Step 8 filters 232+5 = 237 tu-
ples, therefore we end up with 254−37 = 217 possible different values for
(U10 , U
1
1 , U
2
0 , U
2
1 ), and thus there are 2
17 values for (uk10, uk
1
1, uk
2
0, uk
2
1).
This is for the first branch only – if we take into account the four branches,
in total there are 24·17 = 268 colliding key pairs in SC2000-256 . It is inter-
esting to note that the collisions are found independently for each branch.
Thus, to find all 268 colliding key pairs we need only around 4 · 254 = 256
operations.
Application to hash functions. The key collision attack on SC2000-256
leads to practical collisions for single-block-length hash function instanti-
ated with SC2000-256 . Assume that the compression function C(M,H)
is based on the Davies-Meyer construction3, i.e. C(M,H) = EM (H)⊕H.
For the cipher EM (H), we find two colliding keys M1,M2,M1 6= M2, such
that for any plaintext H, it holds EM1(H) = EM2(H). Therefore, in 2
39
time we can find collisions for the compression function as
C(M1, H)⊕ C(M2, H) = EM1(H)⊕H ⊕ EM2(H)⊕H = 0.
The collisions do not depend on the chaining value H, hence the above
result holds for the hash function as well.
Double-block-length hash constructions based on SC2000-256 , are not
collision resistant as well. Let us take Hirose’s construction [8], where the
256-bit compression function C(g, h,M) (here g, h are two 128-bit chain-
ing values, M is 128-bit message block) is based upon a cipher EK(P )
with 256-bit key K and 128-bit state, and it is defined as
C(g, h,M) = Eh||M (g)⊕ g||Eh||M (g ⊕ c)⊕ g ⊕ c,
where || is concatenation of two 128-bit words, and c is some non-zero
constant. Hirose proved the collision resistance level of this construction
to be around 2128, when the underlying cipher is ideal. However, if we use
SC2000-256 , and two colliding keys h1||M1, h2||M2, then for any 128-bit
chaining value g we obtain
C(g, h1,M1)⊕ C(g, h2,M2) =
= [Eh1||M1(g)⊕ g||Eh1||M1(g ⊕ c)⊕ g ⊕ c]⊕ [Eh2||M2(g)⊕ g||Eh2||M2(g ⊕ c)⊕ g ⊕ c] =
= Eh1||M1(g)⊕ g ⊕ Eh2||M2(g)⊕ g||Eh1||M1(g ⊕ c)⊕ g ⊕ c⊕ Eh2||M2(g ⊕ c)⊕ g ⊕ c =
= 0128||0128.
Therefore, instead of 128-bit collision level achieved when using an ideal
cipher, we obtain only 39 bits in the case of SC2000-256 .
3 Among the analyzed by Preneel-Govaerts-Vandewalle[12] secure single-block-length
modes, only Davies-Meyer mode, i.e. C(M,H) = EM (H) ⊕ H allows 256-bit mes-
sages inputs and 128-bit chaining values.
Application to SC2000-128 and SC2000-192. For the cases of 128-bit and
192-bit key SC2000 , the last four, respectively two, words entering the
intermediate key generation are copies of the original master key words.
Hence in these cases two, respectively one, branches of the intermediate
key generation has to be satisfied probabilistically. As there are 96 con-
ditions per branch, and the remaining freedom per branch is 232, and the
branches are cross dependent, i.e. for 128-bit key, the third branch de-
pends on the keys of the first branch, and for 128-bit and 192-bit keys, the
fourth branch depends on the second branch, the analysis for SC2000-256
cannot be extended to SC2000 with 128-bit and 192-bit keys.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the key schedule of SC2000-256 is not injective, and
the cipher has 268 pairs of colliding keys. These pairs are due to the two
weaknesses in the key schedule: the non-symmetric function used in the
second phase easily cancels a particular difference, and the four branches
in the first phase are independent and can be attacked separately. Based
on the combination of the two weaknesses, we have derived an algorithm
that in 239 operations finds one pair of colliding keys, and in 256 finds
all of them. As a proof of concept we have produced colliding keys in a
matter of a few hours on a PC. Thus the collision resistance level of hash
functions based on SC2000-256 is very low.
SC2000-256 suffers from a practically exploitable security weakness
and cannot model an ideal cipher. In spite of the SC2000-256 cipher
being in the CRYPTREC portfolio for more than 10 years and in spite
of considerable previous evaluation, this paper is the first to discover this
design flaw. This is probably due to complexity of the design and is an
example in favor of clean and easy to analyze design strategies.
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